Mechanism Design for Demand Response Programs
Mechanism Design for Demand Response Programs
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2019.2917396
复制
发表时间：
2017-12
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
Deepan Muthirayan;D. Kalathil;K. Poolla;P. Varaiya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Deepan Muthirayan;D. Kalathil;K. Poolla;P. Varaiya
需求响应（DR）计划的作用是在电力供应短缺和昂贵的情况下减少电力消耗。具有灵活消费配置文件的消费者或代理由管理DR程序的聚合器招募。聚合器调用其招募代理池中的一个子集，以减少DR事件期间的用电量。代理商的报酬是根据合同规定的基准减少能源消耗。基线是对代理人在不参加DR计划的情况下可能消耗的能量的反事实消耗估计。基线用于确定支付给代理的费用。这就产生了一种激励，促使代理人为了增加他们收到的报酬而抬高他们的底线。有几个有新闻价值的案例表明，代理人为了经济利益而玩弄他们的底线。我们提出了一种新的自我报告基线机制（SRBM），其中每个代理报告其基线和边际效用。这些报告是战略性的，不必是真实的。聚合器根据报告的信息，以一定的概率选择或调用代理，以满足减载目标。被叫代理人的报酬是根据观察到的自报告基线的减少。未被召唤的代理人将面临消费不足低于其基线的处罚。在SRBM下，我们表明真实报告基线消费和边际效用是一种主导策略。因此，SRBM消除了代理夸大基线的动机。SRBM保证达到减载目标。最后，我们表明SRBM在聚合器所面临的DR提供的平均成本度量中几乎是最优的。
Demand response (DR) programs serve to reduce the consumption of electricity at times when the supply is scarce and expensive. Consumers or agents with flexible consumption profiles are recruited by an aggregator who manages the DR program. The aggregator calls on a subset of its pool of recruited agents to reduce their electricity use during DR events. Agents are paid for reducing their energy consumption from contractually established baselines. Baselines are counter-factual consumption estimates of the energy an agent would have consumed if they were not participating in the DR program. Baselines are used to determine payments to agents. This creates an incentive for agents to inflate their baselines in order to increase the payments they receive. There are several newsworthy cases of agents gaming their baseline for economic benefit. We propose a novel self-reported baseline mechanism (SRBM) where each agent reports its baseline and marginal utility. These reports are strategic and need not be truthful. Based on the reported information, the aggregator selects or calls on agents with a certain probability to meet the load reduction target. Called agents are paid for observed reductions from their self-reported baselines. Agents who are not called face penalties for consumption shortfalls below their baselines. Under SRBM, we show that truthful reporting of baseline consumption and marginal utility is a dominant strategy. Thus, SRBM eliminates the incentive for agents to inflate baselines. SRBM is assured to meet the load reduction target. Finally, we show that SRBM is almost optimal in the metric of average cost of DR provision faced by the aggregator.