A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
复制标题
虚拟贝叶斯实施的表征
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.310425
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发表时间:
2002
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Vohra
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Serrano;R. Vohra
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity - known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).