A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation

A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
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虚拟贝叶斯实施的表征

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.310425
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发表时间:
2002
期刊:
Microeconomic Theory eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
R. Vohra
R. Vohra
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Serrano;R. Vohra

文献摘要

被引文献

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我们提供了满足非完全冷漠环境的纯策略中的虚拟贝叶斯实现的特征。当且仅当满足激励相容性和我们称之为虚拟单调性的条件时,这种环境中的社会选择函数实际上是贝叶斯可实现的。后者比贝叶斯单调性弱——众所周知,贝叶斯单调性是贝叶斯实施所必需的。虚拟单调性较弱,因为它通常在具有至少三种替代方案的环境中得到满足。这意味着在大多数环境中,虚拟贝叶斯实施是尽可能成功的(激励兼容性是唯一需要的条件)。
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity - known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).