The complexity of intersectionality
The complexity of intersectionality
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作者：
McCall, L
自从批评者首次声称女权主义声称代表所有女性，女权主义研究人员就敏锐地意识到性别作为单一分析类别的局限性。事实上，女权主义者在学术界中可能是唯一一个将交叉性（社会关系和主体形成的多个维度和模式之间的关系）视为分析的中心类别的程度的人。甚至可以说，交叉性是迄今为止女性研究与相关领域相结合做出的最重要的理论贡献。 1 然而，尽管交叉性已成为妇女研究和其他领域的主要研究范式，但很少有人讨论如何研究交叉性，即其方法论。如果对交叉性的研究已经很广泛的话，这并不令人担忧。我很感谢 2001 年在加利福尼亚州阿纳海姆举行的美国社会学协会会议的与会者的评论，特别是朱迪思·霍华德和丽莎·布鲁什；罗格斯大学妇女研究所，特别是 Dorothy Sue Cobble 和 Averil Clarke；以及西北大学社会学系性别研讨会，特别是 Ann Orloff 和 Jeff Manza；以及 Vilna Bashi、Maria Cancian、Vivek Chibber 和 Charles Ragin 的作品。在我的交叉性研讨会上，研究生们对本文的早期版本提供了宝贵的反馈，他们的见解贯穿了整个版本。我还从与 Leela Fernandes 和 Irene Browne 的对话以及审稿人的评论中受益匪浅。我感谢罗素·塞奇基金会访问学者计划在本文最初写作期间提供的经济支持。我独自对所有错误和遗漏承担责任。 1 关于术语的重要说明：不可能找到一个既可识别又仅描述本文重点工作类型的术语。许多学者不会将交叉性视为一个中性术语，因为它立即暗示了一种基于身份类别的特定理论范式（例如，参见 Brown 1997）。这并不是我在这里使用该术语的唯一含义；相反，我打算让它包含完全拒绝分析和身份类别可分离性的观点。至于该术语本身的起源，可能首先由 Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991) 强调。许多其他关键文本介绍了概念框架并提供了类似术语：参见 Davis 1981；莫拉加1983；史密斯 1983；胡克1984；莫拉加和安萨尔杜阿 1984；格伦 1985;安萨尔杜阿 1987 年、1990 年；国王1988；莫汉蒂 1988；斯佩尔曼1988；桑多瓦尔 1991。
Since critics first alleged that feminism claimed to speak universally for all women, feminist researchers have been acutely aware of the limitations of gender as a single analytical category. In fact, feminists are perhaps alone in the academy in the extent to which they have embraced intersectionality—the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations—as itself a central category of analysis. One could even say that intersectionality is the most important theoretical contribution that women’s studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so far. 1 Yet despite the emergence of intersectionality as a major paradigm of research in women’s studies and elsewhere, there has been little discussion of how to study intersectionality, that is, of its methodology. This would not be worrisome if studies of intersectionality were already wide rangingI am grateful for comments from participants at the 2001 American Sociological Association meetings in Anaheim, California, especially Judith Howard and Lisa Brush; the Institute for Research on Women at Rutgers University, especially Dorothy Sue Cobble and Averil Clarke; and the Northwestern University Gender Workshop in the Department of Sociology, especially Ann Orloff and Jeff Manza; as well as from Vilna Bashi, Maria Cancian, Vivek Chibber, and Charles Ragin. The graduate students in my seminar on intersectionality provided invaluable feedback on an earlier version of this article, and their insights are woven throughout this version. I have also benefited enormously from conversations with Leela Fernandes and Irene Browne as well as from the reviewers’ comments. For financial support during the initial writing of this article, I thank the Russell Sage Foundation visiting scholars program. I alone bear responsibility for all errors and omissions. 1 A crucial note on terminology: it is impossible to find a term that is both recognizable and merely descriptive of the kind of work that is the focus of this article. Many scholars will not regard intersectionality as a neutral term, for it immediately suggests a particular theoretical paradigm based in identity categories (see, eg, Brown 1997). This is not the only sense in which I use the term here; rather, I intend for it to encompass perspectives that completely reject the separability of analytical and identity categories. As for the origins of the term itself, it was probably first highlighted by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991). Many other key texts introduced the conceptual framework and offered similar terms: see Davis 1981; Moraga 1983; Smith 1983; hooks 1984; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1984; Glenn 1985; Anzaldúa 1987, 1990; King 1988; Mohanty 1988; Spelman 1988; Sandoval 1991.