Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value.
Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value.
复制标题
DOI：
10.1037/a0039996
复制
发表时间：
2016-07
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Lewis RL
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Howes A;Warren PA;Farmer G;El-Deredy W;Lewis RL
上下文偏好逆转发生在对一个选项的偏好被另外的选项所逆转时。有人认为，人类行为中偏好逆转的发生表明，人们违反了理性选择的公理，因此，人们不是期望值最大化者。相比之下，我们证明，如果一个人只能使噪声计算的期望值和噪声观测选项功能之间的顺序关系，那么期望值最大化的选择是由增加新的选项的影响，并引起明显的偏好逆转。我们探讨了期望值最大化选择的影响，条件是嘈杂的观察，一系列的上下文偏好反转类型，包括吸引力，妥协，相似性和幻影效应。这些偏好逆转类型在人类选择模型的发展中发挥了关键作用。我们的结论是，实验表明上下文偏好逆转是不合理的证据。然而，它们是给定噪声观测的期望值最大化的结果。
Contextual preference reversals occur when a preference for one option over another is reversed by the addition of further options. It has been argued that the occurrence of preference reversals in human behavior shows that people violate the axioms of rational choice and that people are not, therefore, expected value maximizers. In contrast, we demonstrate that if a person is only able to make noisy calculations of expected value and noisy observations of the ordinal relations among option features, then the expected value maximizing choice is influenced by the addition of new options and does give rise to apparent preference reversals. We explore the implications of expected value maximizing choice, conditioned on noisy observations, for a range of contextual preference reversal types—including attraction, compromise, similarity, and phantom effects. These preference reversal types have played a key role in the development of models of human choice. We conclude that experiments demonstrating contextual preference reversals are not evidence for irrationality. They are, however, a consequence of expected value maximization given noisy observations.