Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (Revised version now published in Review of Economic Studies, 1985).)
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (Revised version now published in Review of Economic Studies, 1985).)
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DOI：
10.2307/2297737
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发表时间：
1985-10
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig
在一个信息不对称的借贷的简单模型中，我们证明了最优的、激励相容的债务契约是标准债务契约。第二好的投资水平永远不会超过第一好的水平，当有代价高昂的破产的积极可能性时，投资水平会严格地低于第一好水平。我们还将次优结果与利率行为的结果进行了比较，并考虑了风险厌恶的影响。最后，我们提供了一些条件，在这些条件下，增加借款人的初始净财富必须减少对企业的总投资。
In a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information we show that the optimal, incentive-compatible debt contract is the standard debt contract. The second-best level of investment never exceeds the first-best and is strictly less when there is a positive probability of costly bankruptcy. We also compare the second-best with the results of interest-rate-taking behaviour and consider the effects of risk aversion. Finally we provide conditions under which increasing the borrower's initial net wealth must reduce total investment in the venture.