Cognitive phenomenology and conscious thought
Cognitive phenomenology and conscious thought
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DOI：
10.1007/s11097-014-9403-x
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发表时间：
2016-06-01
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Montague, Michelle
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Montague, Michelle
在有意识的思维中，心理内容是如何表现的？首先，我认为，一个思想要成为意识的，这个思想的内容必须是意识的，人们必须诉诸认知现象学来充分说明什么是思想的内容是意识的。感官现象学不能做这项工作。如果一个人声称有意识思想的内容是无意识的，他实际上是在声称没有有意识思想这样的东西。因此，人们要么接受认知现象学的存在，要么否认有意识思维的存在。一旦清楚了意识思维需要认知现象学，就有一个关于思维的认知现象学属性与其内容之间的确切关系的紧迫问题。最后，我讨论了这种关系的性质。
How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as conscious thought. So one must either accept that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology, or deny the existence of conscious thought. Once it is clear that conscious thought requires cognitive phenomenology, there is a pressing question about the exact relationship between a thought's cognitive phenomenological properties and its content. I conclude with a discussion of the nature of this relationship.