Tamper and Leakage Resilience in the Split-State Model
Tamper and Leakage Resilience in the Split-State Model
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_30
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发表时间：
2012-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Feng-Hao Liu;Anna Lysyanskaya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Feng-Hao Liu;Anna Lysyanskaya
众所周知，创建不受边信道和篡改攻击的硬件是非常困难的。因此，许多最近的文献，而不是考虑算法防御这种攻击。在本文中，我们将展示如何从算法上保护任何加密功能免受持续的分裂状态泄漏和篡改攻击。对加密硬件的分裂状态攻击是分别针对硬件的不同部分的攻击。我们的构造并不要求硬件能够访问随机性。相比之下，以前的工作是防止连续的泄漏和篡改[23]，每次更新都需要真正的随机性。我们的构造是在公共引用串（CRS）模型中; CRS必须硬连接到设备中。我们注意到，之前的负面结果表明，它是不可能的算法安全的加密功能，对任意的连续泄漏和篡改攻击的组合没有真正的随机性，因此限制我们的注意力分裂状态模型是合理的。我们的建设是简单的和模块化的，并依赖于一个新的建设，在CRS模型中，不可延展的代码相对于分裂状态篡改功能，这可能是独立的利益。
It is notoriously difficult to create hardware that is immune from side channel and tampering attacks. A lot of recent literature, therefore, has instead consideredalgorithmicdefenses from such attacks. In this paper, we show how to algorithmically secure any cryptographic functionality from continual split-state leakage and tampering attacks. A split-state attack on cryptographic hardware is one that targets separate parts of the hardware separately. Our construction does not require the hardware to have access to randomness. In contrast, prior work on protecting from continual combined leakage and tampering [23] required true randomness for each update. Our construction is in the common reference string (CRS) model; the CRS must be hard-wired into the device. We note that prior negative results show that it is impossible to algorithmically secure a cryptographic functionality against a combination of arbitrary continual leakage and tampering attacks without true randomness; therefore restricting our attention to the split-state model is justified. Our construction is simple and modular, and relies on a new construction, in the CRS model, of non-malleable codes with respect to split-state tampering functions, which may be of independent interest.