Many-to-One Matching Markets with Externalities Among Firms
Many-to-One Matching Markets with Externalities Among Firms
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1865155
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发表时间：
2011-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Keisuke Bando
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keisuke Bando
我们研究的劳动力市场描述的多对一匹配的市场与外部性的企业，其中每个公司的偏好不仅取决于工人谁雇用，但也对工人的竞争对手公司雇用。定义了一个新的稳定性概念--弱稳定性，并研究了它的存在性问题.我们发现，当企业的偏好满足替代性的扩展和两个新的条件称为增加的选择和没有外部效应的一个未选择的工人，那么弱稳定匹配存在。我们还表明，一个弱稳定的匹配可能不存在没有这些限制。
We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm’s preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and investigate its existence problem. We show that when the preferences of firms satisfy an extension of substitutability and two new conditions called increasing choice and no external effect by an unchosen worker, then a weakly stable matching exists. We also show that a weakly stable matching may fail to exist without these restrictions.