Bankruptcy Decision Making
Bankruptcy Decision Making
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破产决策
DOI：
10.1093/jleo/17.2.356
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Morrison
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Baird;E. Morrison
当一家公司遇到财务困境时，很有可能在某个时候，该公司本身应该关闭，其资产得到更好的利用。但是，第11章以及除快速拍卖之外的所有模仿市场的重组制度都将关闭决定委托给了一位缺乏信息和专业知识的破产法官，以及控制其决定时间的能力。了解将关闭决定委托给破产法官的成本，是评估任何公司重组法律的核心。本文将停堆决策建模为真实的期权的行使。该模型表明，在破产案件的早期阶段，关闭决定可能会显得如此重要，以至于它消除了第11章与许多替代市场模仿制度之间的任何重大差异。所有这些制度都比强制拍卖需要更多的时间，从而增加了从市场行为者手中夺走关闭决定的成本。此外，真实的选择权本身也促使各方隐瞒信息。只有强制拍卖制度既限制了关闭期权在非专业决策者手中的时间，又迫使内部人士向决策者提供足够的信息，以便在期权在她手中时对其进行估值。
When a firm encounters financial distress, there is a significant possibility that, at some point, the firm itself should be shut down and its assets put to a better use. But Chapter 11 and indeed all market-mimicking reorganization regimes other than a speedy auction entrust the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judge who lacks information and expertise, as well as the ability to control the timing of her decisions. Understanding the costs of entrusting the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judge is central to assessing any law of corporate reorganizations. This paper models the shutdown decision as the exercise of a real option. The model suggests that the shutdown decision may loom so large in the early parts of the bankruptcy case that it erases any significant difference between Chapter 11 and many alternative market-mimicking regimes. All these regimes take more time than mandatory auctions and thus increase the cost of taking the shutdown decision away from a market actor. Moreover, the real option itself gives parties an incentive to withhold information. Only a system of mandatory auctions both limits the amount of time the shutdown option resides with an inexpert decisionmaker and forces insiders to give that decisionmaker sufficient information to value the option while it is in her hands.