ON THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH AGENDA IN EPISTEMIC CHANGE
ON THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCH AGENDA IN EPISTEMIC CHANGE
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论研究议程在认识变化中的作用
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
David Westlund
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Olsson;David Westlund
【摘要】在形式哲学中，表示认知状态的标准方法是用一组与主体信念相对应的句子和这些句子的顺序来表示，这些句子反映了它们在主体认知状态中的根深蒂固程度。我们认为，这种广泛传播的代表性观点——一种我们称之为“奎因教条”的观点——无法做出某些关键的区分。我们建议，作为补救措施，任何对认知状态的充分表示都必须包括代理的研究议程，即在任何给定时间点开放或关闭的问题列表。如果论文的论证是合理的，那么一方面，一个人的问题和实际兴趣，另一方面，她的信仰和理论价值，就会比之前在形式认识论中所假设的情况更加紧密地交织在一起。
ABSTRACTThe standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology.