Does bank relationship matter for a firm's investment and financial constraints? The case of Taiwan
Does bank relationship matter for a firm's investment and financial constraints? The case of Taiwan
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银行关系对公司的投资和财务约束重要吗？
DOI：
10.1016/j.pacfin.2004.07.004
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Chien
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chung;Chien
本文研究了银行关系对降低投资函数中企业财务信息不对称的影响。银行关系是由一家公司为其借贷活动与之合作的银行数量所代表的。将银行关系进一步划分为两种制度，即强银行关系制度和弱银行关系制度，其中强银行关系制度定义为与贷款有关的银行数量较少的制度，弱银行关系制度定义为与贷款有关的银行数量较多的制度。可以预期，一个强大的银行关系减少了信息不对称，即投资现金流敏感性。基于台湾独特的银行交易数据，我们的研究结果显示，当企业有强大的银行关系时，投资对现金流的敏感性较低。这意味着公司持有较少的现金流用于未来的投资支出。相反，当一家公司与银行的关系较弱时，其投资对现金流很敏感。无论银行关系是由贷款金额还是贷款期限来代理，我们的结果都是稳健的。
This paper investigates the effects of a bank relationship on reducing a firm's financial asymmetric information in an investment function. A bank relationship is proxied by the number of banks that a firm engages for its borrowing activities. A bank relationship is further divided into two regimes, i.e., a strong and a weak bank relationship regime, where the former is defined as one with smaller number of loan related-bank, and the latter is one with a greater number. It is expected that a strong bank relationship reduces the asymmetric information, i.e., investment cash-flow sensitivity here. Based on the examination of unique Taiwanese bank transaction data, our results show that investment is less sensitive to cash flow when a firm has a strong bank relationship. This implies that the firm holds less cash flow in hand for future investment expenditures. By contrast, when a firm has a weak bank relationship, the investment is sensitive to cash-flow. Our results are robust regardless if the bank relationship is proxied by either the loan amount or loan duration.