The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
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多阶段博弈中的启示原理
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdaa041
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Wolitzky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takuo Sugaya;A. Wolitzky
机制设计的通信揭示原则指出，任何可以使用任何通信系统实现的结果也可以通过激励兼容的直接机制来实现。在多阶段博弈中，我们表明，一般来说，通信揭示原理对于顺序均衡的解决方案概念是失败的。然而，它适用于重要的博弈类别，包括单代理博弈、纯逆向选择博弈、纯道德风险博弈以及一类社会学习博弈。对于一般的多阶段博弈，我们确定一个结果在顺序均衡中是可以实现的，当且仅当它可以在典型的纳什均衡中实现时，其中玩家从不采取共同支配的行动。我们还证明了通信揭示原理适用于条件概率完美贝叶斯均衡的更宽松的解决方案概念。 *对于有用的评论，我们感谢 Dirk Bergemann、Drew Fudenberg、Dino Gerardi、Shengwu Li、George Mailath、Roger Myerson、Alessandro Pavan、Harry Pei、Ludovic Renou、Adam Szeidl、Juuso Toikka 和 Bob Wilson；奥斯汀、博科尼、卡洛阿尔贝托学院、考尔斯、哈佛-麻省理工学院、神户、伦敦经济学院、纽约大学、宾夕法尼亚大学、普林斯顿大学、玛丽皇后学院、石溪分校、伦敦大学学院、加州大学洛杉矶分校和加州大学圣地亚哥分校的研讨会参与者；以及匿名审稿人。 Daniel Clark 和 Hideo Suehiro 仔细阅读了这篇论文，并给了我们很好的评论。沃利茨基感谢美国国家科学基金会和斯隆基金会的财政支持。
The communication revelation principle of mechanism design states that any outcome that can be implemented using any communication system can also be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. In multistage games, we show that in general the communication revelation principle fails for the solution concept of sequential equilibrium. However, it holds in important classes of games, including single-agent games, games with pure adverse selection, games with pure moral hazard, and a class of social learning games. For general multistage games, we establish that an outcome is implementable in sequential equilibrium if and only if it is implementable in a canonical Nash equilibrium in which players never take codominated actions. We also prove that the communication revelation principle holds for the more permissive solution concept of conditional probability perfect Bayesian equilibrium. ∗For helpful comments, we thank Dirk Bergemann, Drew Fudenberg, Dino Gerardi, Shengwu Li, George Mailath, Roger Myerson, Alessandro Pavan, Harry Pei, Ludovic Renou, Adam Szeidl, Juuso Toikka, and Bob Wilson; seminar participants at Austin, Bocconi, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Cowles, Harvard-MIT, Kobe, LSE, NYU, UPenn, Princeton, Queen Mary, Stony Brook, UCL, UCLA, and UCSD; and the anonymous referees. Daniel Clark and Hideo Suehiro read the paper carefully and gave us excellent comments. Wolitzky acknowledges financial support from the NSF and the Sloan Foundation.