Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
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DOI：
10.1086/298155
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发表时间：
1987-10
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
R. Gibbons
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Gibbons
本文运用激励理论的最新成果来研究迄今为止对计件工资制的非正式批评。这些非正式的批评是基于在世纪之交试图建立计件工资计划失败的历史。形式分析强调了信息和承诺在契约中的重要性。主要结果如下。在一个以隐藏信息和隐藏行动为特征的工作环境中，如果企业和工人都不能承诺未来的行为，那么任何补偿方案，计件工资或其他方式，都不能诱使工人不限制产出。
This paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece-rate compensation schemes. The informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece-rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century. The formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting. The main result is as follows. In a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action, if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior, then no compensation scheme, piece-rate or otherwise, can induce the worker not to restrict output.