Cross-Border Loss Offset Can Fuel Tax Competition
Cross-Border Loss Offset Can Fuel Tax Competition
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.001
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发表时间：
2013-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Andreas Haufler;M. Mardan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Andreas Haufler;M. Mardan
在最近的法院裁决之后，跨国公司的跨境损失赔偿已成为欧洲的一个主要政策问题。本文分析了在跨国公司选择风险投资规模和东道国非合作选择税率的情况下，引入协调的跨境税收减免的影响。我们发现，协调的跨境损失补偿可能会加剧税收竞争时，按照目前的国际惯例，母公司的母国的基础上退税的亏损子公司自己的税率。因此，在平衡状态下，税收损失可能比改革的直接影响所暗示的还要高。与此相反，当母国根据子公司所在国的税率减免损失时，税收竞争就会减轻。
Following recent court rulings, cross-border loss compensation for multinational firms has become a major policy issue in Europe. This paper analyzes the effects of introducing a coordinated cross-border tax relief in a setting where multinational firms choose the size of a risky investment and host countries non-cooperatively choose tax rates. We show that coordinated cross-border loss compensation may intensify tax competition when, following current international practice, the parent firm's home country bases the tax rebate for a loss-making subsidiary on its own tax rate. In equilibrium, tax revenue losses may thus be even higher than is implied by the direct effect of the reform. In contrast, tax competition is mitigated when the home country bases its loss relief on the tax rate in the subsidiary's host country.