An enhanced-security buck DC-DC converter with true-random-number-based pseudo hysteresis controller for internet-of-everything (IoE) Devices
An enhanced-security buck DC-DC converter with true-random-number-based pseudo hysteresis controller for internet-of-everything (IoE) Devices
复制标题
具有基于真随机数的伪磁滞控制器的增强安全性降压 DC-DC 转换器，适用于万物互联 (IoE) 设备
DOI：
10.1109/isscc.2018.8310216
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Tsung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wen;Li;Shang;Yan;Shao;Ke;Ying;Shian;Tsung
就万物互联（IoE）设备而言，强安全性和低电磁干扰（EMI）是电源管理的设计要求，以保证个人数据保护。[1]在功率侧信道攻击（PSCA）下是鲁棒的，但是功率注入攻击（PIA）导致有限的随机数生成（RN），如图7.5.1的左上角所示。[1]中的循环随机化技术是破解的，并且容易受到PIA的攻击，因为线性反馈移位寄存器（LFSR）中出现了可预测性和再现性。此外，PIA缩小了[1]中基于LFSR的随机开关频率（fSW），并将[2]中的三角调制频率（fmod）降低到fsw的1/N倍左右。因此，EMI本底噪声不符合EN 55032 B类规范，如图7.5.1右上角所示。其他技术提供了对抗措施来提高对恶意攻击的抵抗力，但会导致功耗增加[3]或硬件开销增加[4]。
As far as Internet-of-Everything (IoE) devices are concerned, strong security and low electromagnetic interference (EMI) are design requirements for power management to guarantee personal data protection. [1] is robust under power side-channel attacks (PSCA), but a power injection attack (PIA) results in limited random-number generation (RN), as shown in the upper left of Fig. 7.5.1. The loop randomization technique in [1] is cracked and vulnerable to PIA, since predictability and reproducibility arise in the linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Moreover, the PIA narrows the LFSR-based random switching frequency (fSW) in [1] and reduces the triangular modulation frequency (fmod) in [2] to around 1/N times of fsw. Consequently, the EMI noise floor fails to meet the specification of EN 55032 Class B, as shown in the upper right of Fig. 7.5.1. Other techniques offer counter measures to improve resistance against malicious attacks, but result in either increased power consumption [3] or large hardware overhead [4].