Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning
Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning
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DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdq033
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发表时间：
2011-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz
论文研究在存在不利选择和道德危险的情况下，与项目投资合同。信息获取的扭曲。由于租赁效果取消。道德危害减轻与成本超支有关的扭曲，但与假否定性相关的危害会使那些最佳的机制相关。
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre–project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer’s roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to prevent false project cancelations. Moral hazard mitigates the distortions related to cost overruns yet exacerbates those related to false negatives. The optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts that achieves the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful information revelation.