Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems—Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks
Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems—Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/tcst.2012.2211873
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发表时间：
2013-09
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Saurabh Amin;X. Litrico;S. Sastry;A. Bayen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Saurabh Amin;X. Litrico;S. Sastry;A. Bayen
本简介旨在对具有监管和监督控制层的网络控制系统进行安全威胁评估。我们分析了一类欺骗攻击下比例积分控制器（监管层）和基于模型的诊断方案（监管层）的性能。我们采用保守的方法，假设攻击者了解：1）系统动态； 2）诊断方案的参数； 3) 传感器控制信号。这里介绍的欺骗攻击可以从自动化运河系统远程窃取水。我们还报告了对法国南部吉尼亚克运河系统的现场操作测试攻击。
This brief aims to perform security threat assessment of networked control systems with regulatory and supervisory control layers. We analyze the performance of a proportional-integral controller (regulatory layer) and a model-based diagnostic scheme (supervisory layer) under a class of deception attacks. We adopt a conservative approach by assuming that the attacker has knowledge of: 1) the system dynamics; 2) the parameters of the diagnostic scheme; and 3) the sensor-control signals. The deception attack presented here can enable remote water pilfering from automated canal systems. We also report a field-operational test attack on the Gignac canal system located in Southern France.