Competition and Manipulation in Derivative Contract Markets

Competition and Manipulation in Derivative Contract Markets
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衍生品合约市场的竞争与操纵

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3413265
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
Corporate Finance: Governance
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Anthony Lee Zhang
Anthony Lee Zhang
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Anthony Lee Zhang

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本文研究了现金结算衍生品合约市场中的操纵行为。当交易者使用基于现货价格结算的现金结算衍生品对冲要素风险时,交易者可以通过交易现货来操纵结算价格。在均衡中,操纵可以使所有的代理人变得更糟。我定义了两个措施,操纵引起的福利损失,这可以使用通常观察到的市场数据进行估计。使用这些措施,我估计有多大的操纵引起的扭曲,如果COMEX黄金期货是现金结算使用伦敦金银市场协会黄金价格基准。
This paper studies manipulation in cash-settled derivative contract markets. When traders hedge factor risk using cash-settled derivatives, which are settled based on the price of a spot good, traders can manipulate settlement prices by trading the spot good. In equilibrium, manipulation can make all agents worse off. I define two measures of manipulation-induced welfare losses, which can be estimated using commonly observed market data. Using these measures, I estimate how large manipulation-induced distortions would be if COMEX gold futures were cash-settled using the London Bullion Market Association gold price benchmark.
DOI: 10.2307/1913707
发表时间: 1989-11-01
期刊: ECONOMETRICA
影响因子: 6.1
作者:
KLEMPERER, PD;MEYER, MA
通讯作者: MEYER, MA