Japan, a circumscribed balancer: Building on defensive realism to make predictions about east Asian security
Japan, a circumscribed balancer: Building on defensive realism to make predictions about east Asian security
复制标题
日本，一个受限制的平衡者：以防御现实主义为基础对东亚安全做出预测
DOI：
10.1080/09636410008429416
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Christopher P. Twomey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christopher P. Twomey
近十年来，对美国外交政策的分析通常都是围绕着一个问题：冷战后美国外交政策应该如何改变？尽管来自左翼和右翼的一些分析人士呼吁美国回到更加孤立的姿态，但政策制定者迄今为止没有受到这首塞壬之歌的诱惑。相反，在欧洲，另一个答案已经开始形成--北约已经扩大并改变了它的使命。然而，在东亚，美国冷战时代的惯性，双边联盟继续限制创造性的战略思维。美国在东亚的政策，首先也是最重要的，仍然旨在实现美国对两个地区大国--中国和日本--的目标。为了制定适当的美国在该地区的政策，有必要正确地预测这两个大国之间的未来关系。在本文中，我认为，传统的智慧来自现代现实主义并不能正确地预测日本对中国的行为。今后几十年日本面临的关键问题是如何应对迅速崛起的中国。关于日本选择的传统思维表明，如果可能的话，它将坚定地与中国保持平衡，但如果它自己的平衡努力似乎注定要失败，它将随波逐流。我认为，日本--无论有没有美国作为盟友--都不会自信地与中国保持平衡，也不会追随中国。相反，它将参与我所说的“有限的平衡”。"
F OR NEARLY a decade, analyses of U.S. foreign policy have been routinely framed by a single question: How should U.S. foreign policy change after the cold war? While some analysts from both the left and the right answer by calling for an American return to a more isolationist posture, policymakers have thus far escaped the lure of this siren's song. Instead, in Europe another answer has begun to take shape—NATO has expanded and changed its mission. In East Asia, however, the inertia of America's cold-war-era, bilateral alliances continues to constrain creative strategic thinking. American policy in East Asia, first and foremost, remains aimed at achieving U.S. objectives vis-à-vis the two great regional powers, China and Japan. In order to prescribe appropriate U.S. policy in the region, it is necessary correctly to anticipate the future relations between these two powers. In this paper I argue that conventional wisdom derived from modern realism does not correcdy predict Japanese behavior toward China. The key issue that Japan will face over the next several decades is how to respond to a rapidly rising China. Traditional thinking about Japan's options suggests that it will assertively balance against China if it can, but bandwagon if its own balancing attempts seem doomed. I argue that Japan—with or without the United States as an ally—will neither assertively balance against nor bandwagon with China. Instead it will engage in what I refer to as "circumscribed balancing."