Strategy-proof coalition formation
Strategy-proof coalition formation
复制标题
战略证明联盟的形成
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-009-0162-9
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Carmelo Rodríguez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Carmelo Rodríguez
我们分析了联盟形成问题，其中一组代理被划分为联盟和代理的偏好只取决于他们所属的联盟。我们研究的规则，关联到每个偏好的社会分区配置文件。我们专注于策略证明规则的限制域的偏好，作为域的附加表示或可分离的偏好。在这些领域中，唯一能满足弱效率或非专横和灵活性的防策略和个体理性规则是单重叠规则。单重叠规则的特点是严格限制的可行联盟，是符合层次结构的组织。这些限制对于唯一的核稳定划分的存在是必要且充分的。事实上，单重叠规则总是选择相关的唯一核心稳定分区。因此，我们的研究结果突出了非合作的概念的战略防和合作的概念的唯一性的核心稳定分区之间的关系。
We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents’ preferences only depend on the coalition to which they belong. We study rules that associate to each profile of preferences a partition of the society. We focus on strategy-proof rules on restricted domains of preferences, as the domains of additively representable or separable preferences. In such domains, the only strategy-proof and individually rational rules that satisfy either a weak version of efficiency or non-bossiness and flexibility are single-lapping rules. Single-lapping rules are characterized by severe restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions that are consistent with hierarchical organizations. These restrictions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique core-stable partition. In fact, single-lapping rules always select the associated unique core-stable partition. Thus, our results highlight the relation between the non-cooperative concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative concept of uniqueness of core-stable partitions.
剑桥:剑桥大学出版社
DOI：
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发表时间：
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期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
Shirai;Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)
通讯作者：
Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)