Form and Function in Aristotle
Form and Function in Aristotle
复制标题
亚里士多德的形式和功能
DOI：
10.30965/26664275-02302003
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
0.2
通讯作者：
Boris Hennig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Boris Hennig
一方面，亚里士多德声称物质的物质不是其形式的一部分。另一方面，他建议，对自然事物的适当描述必须包括对其实现的物质种类的说明。有三种可能的策略来应对这种明显的紧张局势。首先，可能有两种定义，因此，对事物形式的定义不包括对其物质的任何说明，而对化合物的定义则包括。第二，物质的定义可能根本不包括对其物质的说明，但仍然揭示了它的形式可以在什么类型的物质中实现。第三，可能存在一种特殊的物质--功能物质，它属于某些事物的形式。我将证明，一个事物的功能物质不属于它的形式(严格意义上的“形式”)，但对自然物质及其功能的充分说明必须涉及对其功能物质的引用。这意味着自然事物的功能与其形式不同，它作为自然事物的适当解释不是一种定义(严格意义上的“形式”和“定义”)。
On the one hand, Aristotle claims that the matter of a material thing is not part of its form. On the other hand, he suggests that the proper account of a natural thing must include a specification of the kind of matter in which it is realized. There are three possible strategies for dealing with this apparent tension. First, there may be two kinds of definition, so that the definition of the form of a thing does not include any specification of its matter, whereas the definition of a compound does. Second, the definition of a substance may not include a specification of its matter at all, but still reveal in what kinds of matter its form can be realized. Third, there may be a special kind of matter, functional matter, which belongs to the form of certain things. I will show that the functional matter of a thing does not belong to its form (in a strict sense of “form”), but that an adequate account of natural substances and their functions must nonetheless involve a reference to their functional matter. This means that the function of a natural thing is not the same as its form and that its adequate account as a natural thing is not a definition (in a strict sense of “form” and “definition”).