Collective Agency and Intentionality: A Critical Theory Perspective
Collective Agency and Intentionality: A Critical Theory Perspective
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集体能动性和意向性：批判理论的视角
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Barbara Fultner
中科院分区：
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作者：
Barbara Fultner
近年来，分析哲学家开始越来越关注共享或“集体意向性”，这个术语泛指我们人类一致行动的能力。从当代认知科学根深蒂固的个人主义观点来看，这种能力代表了一个真正的问题。然而，从批判理论的角度来看，特别是从尤尔根·哈贝马斯的交往行为理论的角度来看，社会始终是我们如何看待代理和自我的组成部分。此外，利用心理学和社会学的实证研究来传达自我和能动性概念的批判理论有着悠久的传统。在本章中，作者展示了主观性和主体间性如何在哈贝马斯理论框架中密不可分地交织在一起，并追溯了哈贝马斯的解释与女性主义自我关系概念的相似之处。
In recent years, analytic philosophers have begun to pay increased attention to shared or “collective intentionality,” a term referring broadly to our human capacity to act in concert. From the deeply rooted individualistic perspective of contemporary cognitive science, this ability represents a real problem. However, from the perspective of critical theory, and of Jurgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action in particular, the social has always been integral to how we think of agency and the self. Furthermore, there is a long tradition in critical theory of using empirical research in psychology and sociology to inform conceptions of self and agency. In this chapter, the author shows how subjectivity and intersubjectivity are inextricably intertwined in the Habermasian theoretical framework, and traces the ways in which Habermasian account parallels feminist conceptions of the self as relational.