A Dilemma for Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
A Dilemma for Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
复制标题
贝纳塔尔不对称论点的困境
DOI：
10.1007/s10677-021-10186-4
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Fumitake Yoshizawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
松本 卓也;武本 一美;Fumitake Yoshizawa
在本文中，我表明，大卫贝纳塔尔的不对称的论点，反出生导致了一个困境。在他的书《Better Never to Have Been》的第二章中，Benatar声称，在伤害和利益之间存在价值论上的不对称，这解释了四种普遍的不对称。基于价值论的不对称性，他为反生育主义的结论辩护，即我们不应该生孩子。要解释的四种普遍的不对称是道德义务、理性、态度或对整个生活的感受。然而，Benatar通过将价值论的不对称性应用于生活的某些部分来解释它们，例如痛苦和快乐。我在这里发现了一个严重的差距。虽然有两种方法可以弥补这一差距，但贝纳塔尔的不对称论点却带来了一个困境。价值论不对称性不被支持，因为它不能解释普遍存在的四种不对称性，否则它不能得出反出生主义的结论。一些哲学家已经批评了贝纳塔尔的不对称性论点，主要是质疑其假设。在本文中，我认为，没有充分的理由同意他的论点，即使其所有明确的假设被接受。
In this paper, I show that David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism leads to a dilemma. In Chapter 2 of his bookBetter Never to Have Been, Benatar claims that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits that explains four prevalent asymmetries. Based on the axiological asymmetry, he defends the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. The four prevalent asymmetries to be explained are moral duties, reasons, attitudes, or feelings concerning life as a whole. However, Benatar explains them by applying the axiological asymmetry to parts of life, such as pains and pleasures. I find a serious gap here. While two ways are available to bridge this gap, a dilemma arises from Benatar’s asymmetry argument. The axiological asymmetry is not supported because it cannot explain the four prevalent asymmetries, or else it cannot lead to the anti-natalist conclusion. A number of philosophers have already criticized Benatar’s asymmetry argument, mainly questioning its assumptions. In this paper, I contend that there is no good reason to agree with his argument even if all its explicit assumptions are accepted.