Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels
Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.01.002
复制
发表时间：
2013-04
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Anil Arya;B. Mittendorf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anil Arya;B. Mittendorf
披露文献中的一个流行观点是，了解到有利市场信息的公司不愿意披露这些信息，担心这会吸引新的竞争对手。在本文中，我们证明了双重分销安排的存在，其中消费者可以从传统的零售企业或直接从供应商购买产品，可以显着改变披露激励。根据普遍的看法，零售商披露积极的消息有被竞争对手进入的风险。然而，进入改变了现有的制造商-零售商关系：新竞争对手的存在导致供应商将其零售商更多地视为战略合作伙伴，从而降低批发价格。这反过来又会导致零售商愿意分享有利的消息，因为这种披露恰恰在零售商从价格优惠中获益最多的时候邀请进入。我们的研究结果表明，随着双重分销的重要性不断增加，企业可能更愿意自愿披露敏感的财务信息，特别是那些指向对其产品的高需求的信息。
A prevailing view in the disclosure literature is that firms who learn favorable market information are reluctant to disclose it, fearing it will attract new rivals. In this paper, we demonstrate that the presence of dual distribution arrangements, wherein consumers can purchase products either from traditional retail firms or directly from suppliers, can notably alter disclosure incentives. As under prevailing views, a retailer disclosing positive news risks entry by competitors. However, entry shifts the incumbent supplier–retailer relationship: the presence of new competitors leads the supplier to treat its retailer more as a strategic partner, translating into lower wholesale prices. This, in turn, can lead the retailer to willingly share favorable news, since such disclosure invites entry precisely when the retailer stands to benefit most from price concessions. Our results suggest that as dual distribution continues to increase in prominence, firms may be more willing to voluntarily disclose sensitive financial information particularly that which points to high demand for its products.