Risk assessment for infectious disease and its impact on voluntary vaccination behavior in social networks
Risk assessment for infectious disease and its impact on voluntary vaccination behavior in social networks
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DOI：
10.1016/j.chaos.2014.07.004
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发表时间：
2014-11-01
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Ikegaya, Naoki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fukuda, Eriko;Kokubo, Satoshi;Ikegaya, Naoki
实现群体免疫对于防止流感等传染病的周期性传播至关重要。如果疫苗接种是自愿的，随着疫苗接种覆盖率接近群体免疫所需的临界水平，个人接种疫苗的动机就会减少；这就导致了通过群体免疫巧妙地避免感染并避免支付任何费用的所谓“搭便车”人数的增加。我们使用一个起源于进化博弈论的框架，从流行病学和是否接种疫苗的决策方面来研究这种类型的社会困境。对于人群中的每个人来说，接种疫苗的决定与如何评估感染风险有关。在这项研究中，我们提出了一个新的风险评估模型，在疫苗接种博弈中，当一个人更新她的策略时，她将自己的收益与通过对采用相同策略的个人的集体收益进行平均而获得的净收益进行比较。在以前对疫苗接种游戏的研究中，当一个人更新她的策略时，她通常会将自己的回报与随机选择的邻居的回报进行比较，这表明改变她的策略的风险主要基于另一个人的行为，即这是基于个人的风险评估。然而，在我们提出的模型中，任何个人的风险评估都是基于一项战略的集体成功，而不是基于任何其他个人的行为。对于策略适应，每个人都会对邻居所采取的某一策略的成功程度进行调查，即这是一种基于策略的风险评估。使用计算机模拟，我们确定这两种不同的风险评估方法如何影响传染病在社会网络中的传播。根据社会网络的结构和疫苗接种成本的不同，建议的模型被发现对人群有利。我们的结果表明，个人(或政府)应该了解他们在区域一级的社会网络的结构，因此，他们应该根据情况的需要采取适当的风险评估方法。(C)2014爱思唯尔有限公司。保留所有权利。
Achievement of the herd immunity is essential for preventing the periodic spreading of an infectious disease such as the flu. If vaccination is voluntary, as vaccination coverage approaches the critical level required for herd immunity, there is less incentive for individuals to be vaccinated; this results in an increase in the number of so-called "free-riders" who craftily avoid infection via the herd immunity and avoid paying any cost. We use a framework originating in evolutionary game theory to investigate this type of social dilemma with respect to epidemiology and the decision of whether to be vaccinated. For each individual in a population, the decision on vaccination is associated with how one assesses the risk of infection. In this study, we propose a new risk-assessment model in a vaccination game when an individual updates her strategy, she compares her own payoff to a net payoff obtained by averaging a collective payoff over individuals who adopt the same strategy as that of a randomly selected neighbor. In previous studies of vaccination games, when an individual updates her strategy, she typically compares her payoff to the payoff of a randomly selected neighbor, indicating that the risk for changing her strategy is largely based on the behavior of one other individual, i.e., this is an individual-based risk assessment. However, in our proposed model, risk assessment by any individual is based on the collective success of a strategy and not on the behavior of any one other individual. For strategy adaptation, each individual always takes a survey of the degree of success of a certain strategy that one of her neighbors has adopted, i.e., this is a strategy-based risk assessment. Using computer simulations, we determine how these two different risk-assessment methods affect the spread of an infectious disease over a social network. The proposed model is found to benefit the population, depending on the structure of the social network and cost of vaccination. Our results suggest that individuals (or governments) should understand the structure of their social networks at the regional level, and accordingly, they should adopt an appropriate risk-assessment methodology as per the demands of the situation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.