Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets
Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets
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补贴竞争和不完善的劳动力市场
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12400
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Yamamoto Kazuhiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Morita Tadashi;Sawada Yukiko;Yamamoto Kazuhiro
本文提出了一个在劳动力市场不完善条件下制造业企业补贴竞争的两国模型。由于补贴影响了企业的分布，补贴也影响了两国的失业率和福利。我们发现，当劳动力市场摩擦高，补贴竞争是有益的，虽然补贴竞争下的补贴是无效率的高。在协调均衡中，超国家当局向企业提供的补贴等于预期的总搜索成本，这增加了相对于自由放任的企业数量，并改善了相对于自由放任和补贴竞争的福利。最后，我们发现，在一个国家的劳动力市场摩擦的上升，提高了均衡补贴率，影响失业率，并降低福利。
This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.