Nuclear energy and nuclear weapon-potential: The case of Japan in the 1960s
Nuclear energy and nuclear weapon-potential: The case of Japan in the 1960s
复制标题
核能和核武器潜力:20 世纪 60 年代日本的案例
DOI:
10.1080/10736700.2017.1367536
复制
发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Akira Kurosaki
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
喜多川進;佐藤圭一;水野祥子;北見宏介;伊藤康;西澤栄一郎;小野一;辻信一;Akira Kurosaki
This article analyzes Japan's development of civilian nuclear energy and its potential for developing nuclear weapons in the late 1960s. First, it examines two technological studies of Japan's nuclear fissionable material production capability: one sponsored by the Japanese government and the other sponsored by the US government. A comparative analysis of them reveals that the Japanese study did not investigate the full range of feasible measures toward Japan's nuclear armament. Further scrutiny of Japanese nuclear-energy development in relation to its policy-making structure at that time draws out the following arguments: (1) Japan's civilian nuclear program clearly contributed to its acquisition of a latent nuclear weapon potential; (2) Japan had not deliberately developed the latent capability, which reflected the lack of coordination among political actors; (3) Japan increased its dependence on the United States in the nuclear-power field, making its pursuit of nuclear weapons politically more difficult. This case study of Japan illustrates not only the intricate relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power, the development of nuclear-weapon potential, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also the effects of the state’s nuclear-policy-making structure on its nuclear posture.