Indirect Governance at War: Delegation and Orchestration in Rebel Support
Indirect Governance at War: Delegation and Orchestration in Rebel Support
复制标题
战争中的间接治理：叛军支持中的授权和协调
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Marius Mehrl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tim Heinkelmann‐Wild;Marius Mehrl
国家不是直接攻击他们的对手，而是通过支持反叛组织间接做到这一点。虽然这些支持关系差异很大，但现有的研究缺乏对此的全面描述。为了解释政府对支持的选择，我们建议根据它们为国家提供的对叛军的控制机会来区分两种支持关系模式：授权允许“插手”控制，而“不插手”协调允许貌似有理的否认，并且不损害叛军在当地的合法性。我们认为，当“动手”控制可以被目标调整或竞争取代时，赞助商更喜欢编排；当冲突非常突出时，他们更喜欢委托。使用1975-2009年期间的全球数据进行的测试支持前两种预期。令人惊讶的是，各州的能力也使“不插手”编排变得更有可能。本文从间接治理理论转向间接战争研究，并对其进行统计检验，从而推进了对外部叛军支持的理解。
Instead of attacking their adversaries directly, states often do so indirectly by supporting rebel groups. While these support relationships vary considerably, existing research lacks a comprehensive account thereof. To explain states’ choice of support, we suggest differentiating between two modes of support relationships according to the control opportunities they offer states over rebels: while delegation enables “hands-on” control, “hands-off” orchestration allows for plausible deniability and does not harm rebels’ local legitimacy. We argue that sponsors prefer orchestration when “hands-on” control can be substituted by goal alignment or competition; and they prefer delegation when the conflict is highly salient. Tests using global data for the period 1975-2009 support the first two expectations. Surprisingly, states’ capabilities also render “hands-off” orchestration more likely. The paper advances the understanding of external rebel support by transferring insights from indirect governance theory to the study of indirect wars and putting it to statistical test.