Making Paper Reviewing Robust to Bid Manipulation Attacks
Making Paper Reviewing Robust to Bid Manipulation Attacks
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发表时间：
2021-02
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通讯作者：
Ruihan Wu;Chuan Guo;Felix Wu;Rahul Kidambi;L. Maaten;Kilian Q. Weinberger
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作者：
Ruihan Wu;Chuan Guo;Felix Wu;Rahul Kidambi;L. Maaten;Kilian Q. Weinberger
大多数计算机科学会议依靠论文招标来分配论文评审员。虽然论文招标在提交数量空前的情况下实现了高质量的作业，但它也为不诚实的审稿人打开了大门，从而对论文评审作业产生不利影响。传闻证据表明，一些审稿人对“朋友”或串通作者的论文进行投标，即使这些论文超出了他们的专业领域，并推荐他们接受，而不考虑工作的优点。在本文中，我们研究了这种投标操纵攻击的有效性，并发现，事实上，它们可以危及审查过程的完整性。我们开发了一种新的方法，纸张投标和分配，是更强大的对这种攻击。我们的经验表明，我们的方法提供了鲁棒性，即使不诚实的审稿人勾结，有充分的知识分配系统的内部工作，并获得系统的输入。除了更强大之外，我们的论文评审作业的质量与当前的非强大作业方法相当。
Most computer science conferences rely on paper bidding to assign reviewers to papers. Although paper bidding enables high-quality assignments in days of unprecedented submission numbers, it also opens the door for dishonest reviewers to adversarially influence paper reviewing assignments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some reviewers bid on papers by"friends"or colluding authors, even though these papers are outside their area of expertise, and recommend them for acceptance without considering the merit of the work. In this paper, we study the efficacy of such bid manipulation attacks and find that, indeed, they can jeopardize the integrity of the review process. We develop a novel approach for paper bidding and assignment that is much more robust against such attacks. We show empirically that our approach provides robustness even when dishonest reviewers collude, have full knowledge of the assignment system's internal workings, and have access to the system's inputs. In addition to being more robust, the quality of our paper review assignments is comparable to that of current, non-robust assignment approaches.