Signatures Resilient to Uninvertible Leakage
Signatures Resilient to Uninvertible Leakage
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DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-44618-9_20
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发表时间:
2016-08
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Yuyu Wang;Takahiro Matsuda;Goichiro Hanaoka;Keisuke Tanaka
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文献类型:
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作者:
Yuyu Wang;Takahiro Matsuda;Goichiro Hanaoka;Keisuke Tanaka
In this paper, we present a fully leakage resilient signature scheme in the selective auxiliary input model, which captures an extremely wide class of side-channel attacks that are based on physical implementations of algorithms rather than public parameters chosen. Our signature scheme keeps existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks as long as the adversary cannot completely recover the entire secret state from leakage in polynomial time with non-negligible probability. Formally speaking, the leakage is allowed to be any computable uninvertible function on input the secret state, without any additional restrictions. We instantiate such a signature scheme by exploiting a point-function obfuscator with auxiliary input (AIPO) and a differing-inputs obfuscator (diO).As far as we know, this is the first signature scheme secure against uninvertible leakage. Furthermore, our signature scheme is public-coin, in the sense that the randomness used in the signing procedure is a part of a signature and no additional secret randomness is used.Additionally, we provide a variant of the above signature scheme, for which leakage functions are additionally required to be injective, and the sizes of the circuits representing leakage functions are upper bounded. This scheme is resilient to uninvertible leakage that information-theoretically determines the secret information, and can be constructed based only on diO, without exploiting AIPO.