Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.99.5.1979
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发表时间：
2004-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Victor Lavy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Victor Lavy
许多国家正在引入与绩效挂钩的教师激励性薪酬，但几乎没有证据表明其效果。本文评估了以色列英语、希伯来语和数学教师之间的排名锦标赛。教师因提高学生在中考中的表现而获得现金奖励。两种识别策略被用来评估计划的效果，回归不连续设计和倾向得分匹配。回归不连续性方法既利用了分配变量中的测量误差所产生的自然实验，也利用了分配到处理变量中的急剧不连续。结果表明，绩效激励对直接受影响的学生有显著的影响，对未处理的学生有较小的溢出效应。这些改进似乎源于教学方法的改变、课外教学以及对学生需求的反应能力的提高。没有发现教师操纵考试成绩的证据。这项计划似乎比学校团体的现金奖金或额外的授课时间更具成本效益，而且对学生来说与现金奖金一样有效。
Performance-related incentive pay for teachers is being introduced in many countries, but there is little evidence of its effects. This paper evaluates a rank-order tournament among teachers of English, Hebrew, and mathematics in Israel. Teachers were rewarded with cash bonuses for improving their students' performance on high-school matriculation exams. Two identification strategies were used to estimate the program effects, a regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching. The regression discontinuity method exploits both a natural experiment stemming from measurement error in the assignment variable and a sharp discontinuity in the assignment-to-treatment variable. The results suggest that performance incentives have a significant effect on directly affected students with some minor spillover effects on untreated subjects. The improvements appear to derive from changes in teaching methods, after-school teaching, and increased responsiveness to students' needs. No evidence found for teachers' manipulation of test scores. The program appears to have been more cost-effective than school-group cash bonuses or extra instruction time and is as effective as cash bonuses for students.