Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests
Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests
复制标题
团体赛中的努力互补和分享规则
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-020-01277-9
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Katsuya Kobayashi and Hideo Konishi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
安藤至大;片岡八重子;黒木正郎;富田裕;安藤至大;安藤至大;Katsuya Kobayashi and Hideo Konishi
在本文中，我们考虑了一个奖励分享规则设计问题，在一个组内的努力互补性，采用CES努力聚合函数。我们得出的条件垄断规则，占主导地位的平均主义规则，如果规则设计的目标是最大限度地提高集团的获胜概率。我们发现的条件下，垄断规则最大限度地提高了集团的获胜概率，而平等主义的规则是严格的首选组的所有成员。没有努力的互补性，就不可能有这种利益冲突。
In this paper, we consider a prize-sharing rule design problem in a group contest with effort complementarities within groups by employing a CES effort aggregator function. We derive the conditions for a monopolization rule that dominates an egalitarian rule if the objective of the rule design is to maximize the group’s winning probability. We find conditions under which the monopolization rule maximizes the group’s winning probability, while the egalitarian rule is strictly preferred by all members of the group. Without effort complementarity, there cannot be such a conflict of interest.