Who delivers? Partisan clients in the argentine electoral market
Who delivers? Partisan clients in the argentine electoral market
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DOI：
10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00099.x
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发表时间：
2004-10-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Murillo, MV
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Calvo, E;Murillo, MV
为什么一些政党未能在猪肉泛滥的政治体系中从赞助中受益？本文分析了赞助和党派之间的相互作用，以解释为什么一些现任者比其他人更有可能从猪肉政治中受益。我们通过关注政党获得资源（供应方）和选民对财政慷慨的依赖（需求方）来解释这种差异。我们展示了这些差异如何影响赞助人的选择公共部门的工资和就业。我们使用国家以下一级的数据，以显示不同的选举回报，从赞助的两个主要的政治联盟在阿根廷庇隆主义和UCR-Alianza-和他们的影响偏好公共部门的工资和就业。
Why do some parties fail to benefit fro in patronage in pork-ridden political systems? This article analyzes the interaction between patronage and partisanship to explain why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from pork politics than others. We explain such differences by focusing on political parties access to resources (supply side) and voters' dependence on fiscal largesse (demand side). We show how these differences affect the patron's choice of public sector wages and employment. We use subnational level data to show different electoral returns from patronage for the two major political coalitions in Argentina-Peronism and the UCR-Alianza-and their effect on preferences over public sector wages and employment.