CEO Stakes and Board Composition in Small Private Firms

CEO Stakes and Board Composition in Small Private Firms
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小型私营企业首席执行官持股和董事会组成

DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Dennis
W. Dennis
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
Mark K. Fiegener;B. Brown;Dirk R. Dreux;W. Dennis

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小公司的首席执行官必须在董事会组成选择上调和两种相互矛盾的利益。由“独立”董事（与CEO没有私人或职业关系的个人）代表的董事会可能更有效地提供良好的建议和与外部资源的联系，但也可能限制CEO的自由裁量权。本研究探讨了CEO所有权、家族和代际“利害关系”在企业中的作用——CEO保护自由裁量权免受董事会干涉的意愿——是否与董事会构成有关。结果（对2365家小型私营企业的调查）表明，拥有更大所有权和家族股权的首席执行官的独立董事会组成较少。
CEOs of small firms must reconcile two countervailing interests with respect to their board composition choices. Boards with substantial representation by “Independent” directors—individuals who are not linked to the CEO via personal or professional relationships—may be more effective in providing good counsel and linkages to external resources, but may also limit CEO discretion. This study investigates whether CEO ownership, family, and generational “stakes” in the business—indicators of CEO desire to protect discretion from board interference—are related to board composition. The results (survey of 2365 small private firms) indicate that CEOs with greater ownership and family stakes have less independent board compositions.