Polarization and Pandering in Common-value Elections
Polarization and Pandering in Common-value Elections
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共同价值选举中的两极分化和迎合
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joseph McMurray
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Joseph McMurray
标准的选举模型有力地预测候选人应该采取温和的政策，特别是如果他们重视赢得选举，这对选民福利有好处。因此，经验上的两极分化既令人费解又令人不安。本文表明，如果选民的分歧反映了对一个潜在的真理变量的信念，而不是特质偏好，那么极化是稳健的均衡预测，即使当获胜的价值很高，因为双方都声称优越。因此，适度可能是不受欢迎的，因为它是一种迎合民意的空间形式，尽管更大的危险是过度极端主义，这可能是过度自信的结果。关键词：投票，选举，意识形态，中间选民，信息聚合，极化，陪审团定理，公众舆论，认知民主，过度自信
Standard election models robustly predict that candidates should adopt moderate policies, especially if they value winning o¢ ce, and that this is good for voter welfare. Empirical polarization is therefore both inexplicable and troubling. This paper shows that if voter di¤erences reect beliefs about an underlying truth variable, rather than idiosyncratic preferences, then polarization is the robust equilibrium prediction, even when the value of winning is high, as both sides claim superiority. Moderation can then be undesirable, as a spatial form of pandering to popular opinion, though the greater danger is over-extremism, which can result from overcondence. JEL Classication Number D72, D82 Keywords: Voting, Elections, Ideology, Median Voter, Information Aggregation, Polarization, Jury Theorem, Public Opinion, Epistemic Democracy, Overcondence