Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
复制标题
具有互补性和已知预算限制的同步升序拍卖
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Giuseppe Lopomo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sandro Brusco;Giuseppe Lopomo
我们研究了两个相同物品的同时递增拍卖，当投标人受到资金限制并且他们的估价表现出互补性时。我们假设预算约束是已知的，但单个对象的值是私人信息，并刻画了非共谋均衡。均衡行为受暴露问题的影响。预算较高的竞标者更不愿意竞标，因为预算较低的对手可能最终追求单一目标，从而阻碍互补的实现。因此，当没有最高估值时，差劲的竞标者可能会同时赢得这两件物品。
We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, and characterize noncollusive equilibria. Equilibrium behavior is affected by the exposure problem. Bidders with higher budgets are more reluctant to bid, because opponents with lower budgets may end up pursuing a single object, thus preventing the realization of complementarities. Therefore poor bidders may win both objects when they do not have the highest valuation.