Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets
Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets
复制标题
匹配市场的近似效率
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_18
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Joshua Mollner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nicole Immorlica;Brendan Lucier;Glen Weyl;Joshua Mollner
我们提出了匹配市场中近似事前帕累托效率的度量。根据这一度量，匹配的彩票是\(\gamma \)——如果没有使每个代理的事前预期效用增加\(\gamma \)因子的备用彩票，则彩票是近似有效的。如果在均衡状态下产生的每个彩票都是\(\gamma \)，那么这个机制就是\(\gamma \) -近似有效的。我们认为，这是可转移效用设置中的近似效率向不可转移效用设置的自然延伸。利用这一概念，我们能够量化所谓的波士顿机制和最近提出的选择增强延迟接受机制相对于随机序列独裁机制的直觉效率提高。此外，我们提供了Raffle机制的第一个正式声明和分析，该机制在概念上比波士顿机制更简单，并且具有相当的效率保证。
We propose a measure of approximate ex-ante Pareto efficiency in matching markets. According to this measure, a lottery over matchings is \(\gamma \)-approximately efficient if there is no alternate lottery in which each agent’s ex-ante expected utility increases by an \(\gamma \) factor. A mechanism is \(\gamma \)-approximately efficient if every lottery produced in equilibrium is \(\gamma \)-approximately efficient. We argue this is the natural extension of approximate efficiency in transferable-utility settings to our nontransferable-utility setting. Using this notion, we are able to quantify the intuited efficiency improvement of the so-called Boston mechanism and the recently-proposed choice-augmented deferred acceptance mechanism over the random serial dictatorship mechanism. Furthermore, we provide the first formal statement and analysis of the Raffle mechanism, which is conceptually simpler than the Boston mechanism and has a comparable efficiency guarantee.
战略主体的纳什社会福利近似
影响因子：
2.7
作者：
Brânzei, Simina;Gkatzelis, Vasilis;Mehta, Ruta
通讯作者：
Mehta, Ruta