Side-channel Attacks on Blinded Scalar Multiplications Revisited
Side-channel Attacks on Blinded Scalar Multiplications Revisited
复制标题
重新审视盲标量乘法的旁道攻击
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Victor Lomné
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Thomas Roche;L. Imbert;Victor Lomné
在最近的一系列文章（从2011年到2017年）中，Schindler等人表明，指数/标量盲化并不是针对RSA模幂运算和ECC标量乘法的侧信道攻击的有效对策。确切地说，这些工作表明，如果攻击者能够检索到相同秘密的许多随机化，即使当盲化秘密位的显著比例是错误的，这个秘密也可以完全恢复。本文以椭圆曲线密码体制为研究对象，改进了Schindler等人在结构阶椭圆曲线上的最佳结果。我们的研究结果表明，较大的致盲材料和较高的错误率可以成功地处理在实践中的攻击者。这项研究还开辟了新的方向，在这一行的工作，提出了一个三步攻击过程，隔离攻击的关键路径（在复杂性和成功率方面），从而简化了未来的解决方案的发展。
In a series of recent articles (from 2011 to 2017), Schindler et al. show that exponent/scalar blinding is not as effective a countermeasure as expected against side-channel attacks targeting RSA modular exponentiation and ECC scalar multiplication. Precisely, these works demonstrate that if an attacker is able to retrieve many randomizations of the same secret, this secret can be fully recovered even when a significative proportion of the blinded secret bits are erroneous. With a focus on ECC, this paper improves the best results of Schindler et al. in the specific case of structured-order elliptic curves. Our results show that larger blinding material and higher error rates can be successfully handled by an attacker in practice. This study also opens new directions in this line of work by the proposal of a three-steps attack process that isolates the attack critical path (in terms of complexity and success rate) and hence eases the development of future solutions.