Changing the Intensity of Interaction Based on Individual Behavior in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Changing the Intensity of Interaction Based on Individual Behavior in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
复制标题
迭代囚徒困境博弈中基于个体行为改变交互强度
DOI：
10.1109/tevc.2016.2628385
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发表时间：
2017-08-01
影响因子：
14.3
通讯作者：
Zhang, Jianlei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li, Jiaqi;Zhang, Chunyan;Zhang, Jianlei
本文提出了一个基于个体行为改变交互强度的模型来研究社交网络中的重复囚徒困境博弈。在该模型中，每个人都有一个评估得分的声誉，这是通过考虑其当前行为的评价水平的互动伙伴获得。我们关注的是评价水平对个体间互动强度变化的影响。对于行为良好的个体，其伙伴对其良好行为的评价水平越高，其声誉越好，周围伙伴与其互动的概率也越高;相反，对于行为不良的个体，其伙伴对其不良行为的评价水平越低，其声誉越差，仿真结果表明，这种有效的机制可以极大地促进群体在危险芯片下合作的产生和维持.有趣的是，对于小的或中等的叛逆芯片，合作水平随着评价水平的增加而单调上升;然而，对于较高的叛逆芯片，存在一个最优的评价水平，这可以导致最佳的合作促进。此外，我们发现更好的模拟结果和理论预测从扩展的对近似方法之间的协议，虽然有一些微小的偏差。我们还展示了一些典型的快照系统，并调查的外观和持久性的合作的原因。研究结果进一步说明了个体行为评价水平在协同进化关系中的重要性。
We present a model of changing the intensity of interaction based on the individual behavior to study the iterated prisoner's dilemma game in social networks. In this model, each individual has an assessed score of reputation which is obtained by considering the evaluation level of interactive partners for its present behavior. We focus on the effect of evaluation level on the changing intensity of interaction between individuals. For an individual with good behavior, the higher the evaluation level of its partners for its good behavior, the better its reputation, and the higher the probability of surrounding partners interaction with it. On the contrary, for an individual with bad behavior, the lower the evaluation level of its partners for its bad behavior, the worse its reputation, and the less the probability of surrounding neighbors interaction with it. Simulation results show that this effective mechanism can drastically facilitate the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in the population under a treacherous chip. Interestingly, for a small or moderate treacherous chip, the cooperation level monotonously ascends as the evaluation level increases; however, for a higher treacherous chip, existing an optimal evaluation level, which can result in the best promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, we find better agreement between simulation results and theoretical predictions obtained from an extended pair-approximation method, although there are some tiny deviations. We also show some typical snapshots of the system and investigate the reason for appearance and persistence of cooperation. The results further show the importance of evaluation level of individual behavior in coevolutionary relationships.