Social preferences, skill segregation, and wage dynamics
Social preferences, skill segregation, and wage dynamics
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00460.x
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发表时间：
2008-01-01
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Pavoni, Nicola
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cabrales, Antonio;Calvo-Armengol, Antoni;Pavoni, Nicola
我们研究了一个模型中的收入结构和工人的均衡分配的企业，其中工人有社会偏好，和技能是完全可替代的生产。公司提供长期合同，我们允许劳动力市场以流动成本的形式出现摩擦。该模型提供了具体的预测工人流动的性质，关于工作场所的技能隔离的特点，以及关于工资分散在企业内部和企业之间。我们发现，在社会偏好的存在下，长期合同与公司内的工资分散与新的“内部劳动力市场”的功能，如逐步晋升，生产力无关的工资增长，和向下的工资灵活性。这三个动态特征导致了企业内部与生产率无关的工资波动。
We study the earning structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers to firms in a model in which workers have social preferences, and skills are perfectly substitutable in production. Firms offer long-term contracts, and we allow for frictions in the labour market in the form of mobility costs. The model delivers specific predictions about the nature of worker flows, about the characteristics of workplace skill segregation, and about wage dispersion both within and across firms. We show that long-term contracts in the presence of social preferences associate within-firm wage dispersion with novel "internal labour market" features such as gradual promotions, productivity-unrelated wage increases, and downward wage flexibility. These three dynamic features lead to productivity-unrelated wage volatility within firms.