Contracts as Rent‐Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer
Contracts as Rent‐Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer
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合同作为寻租工具：来自德国足球的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Gerd Muehlheusser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Feess;M. Gerfin;Gerd Muehlheusser
最近的理论研究已经确定了合同如何在第三方面前被用作寻租手段的多种方式，但到目前为止还没有关于这一问题的经验证据。为了检验这篇文献的一些基本性质，我们在欧洲职业足球的背景下开发了一个理论和经验框架，其中(现任)俱乐部和球员签署了具有约束力的合同，然而，当其他俱乐部(进入者)想要聘用该球员时，这些合同经常被重新谈判。由于长期合同在重新谈判中削弱了进入者，因此对缔约各方来说，它们是有用的寻租手段。然而，从社会角度来看，它们导致了配置扭曲，阻碍了有效的转移。由于现有俱乐部在重新谈判中往往比球员从长期合同中受益更多，因此在同意长期合同时，必须事先通过更高的工资来补偿这些好处。使用来自德国“德甲”的数据，我们的模型预测得到了广泛的证实。特别是，我们的分析支持了理论文献中表达的关于战略合同对配置低效的不利影响的担忧。
Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent seeking devices vis-a-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theoretical and empirical framework in the context of European professional soccer where (incumbent) clubs and players sign binding contracts which are, however, frequently renegotiated when other clubs (entrants) want to hire the player. Because they weaken entrants in renegotiations, long term contracts are useful rent seeking devices for the contracting parties. From a social point of view, however, they lead to allocative distortions in the form of deterring efficient transfers. Since incumbent clubs tend to benefit more from long term contracts in renegotiations than players, these must be compensated ex ante by a higher wage when agreeing to a long term contract. Using data from the German "Bundesliga", our model predictions are broadly confirmed. In particular, our analysis supports the concerns expressed in the theoretical literature about detrimental effects of strategic contracting on allocative inefficiency.