Generics designate kinds but not always essences
Generics designate kinds but not always essences
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1900105116
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发表时间：
2019-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alexander Noyes;F. Keil
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alexander Noyes;F. Keil
人们如何推理“类”（具有高归纳潜力的结构丰富的类别）是认知理论的核心。有一种理论认为人们偏向于本质化，认为人们倾向于推断种类是由内部属性（本质）自然决定的。一般性的陈述（“男人喜欢运动”）旨在唤起这种偏见。我们通过对比一个类别是一种的信念与一个类别具有本质结构的信念来推进方法。我们揭示了泛型存在的灵活性：在不同的领域和财产内容，通用语句增加了参与者的信念，一个类别是丰富的结构与高归纳潜力。泛型在与其他线索的交互中导致了本质主义（例如，生物学特性），合理地提示本质主义的解释。人们认为有些范畴是具有可靠因果结构和高归纳潜力的范畴（例如，老虎）。被广泛认可的理论认为，人们有偏见地认为种类是必不可少的，因此自然地由内部因果属性决定。通用语言（例如，“男人喜欢运动”）被认为是引起这种偏见的一种机制。相反，我们建议泛型原则上指定范畴是种类。参与者可以在泛型存在的情况下娱乐不同的因果结构：听到生物特性概括为一个类别（例如，“男人留胡子”）促使参与者推断基本结构，但听到中性或社会属性（“女人工资过低”）的概括性提示其他因果信念。因此，类属只有在与合理地提示本质主义解释的线索相互作用时才会引发本质主义。我们测试了我们的模型与成人参与者（n = 739），使用的措施，从善良的信念解开本质主义的信念。在研究1中，我们用我们的新措施复制了以前的方法，并发现泛型比本质主义更能影响种类信念。在研究2中，我们改变了属性内容（生物属性与文化属性），并表明当与生物属性配对时，泛型只会增加本质主义。在研究3中，我们发现，当中性属性在动物、工具和人之间使用时，泛型表示种类，而不是本质主义。在研究4中，我们表明，相信一个类别是一种增加了类属陈述的自发产生，无论这种类型是必要的还是社会构建的。泛型不需要本质主义的信念。参与者对种类的推理是灵活的。
Significance How people reason about “kinds” (richly structured categories with high inductive potential) is at the heart of theories of cognition. One theory characterizes people as biased to essentialize, concluding that people are biased to infer that kinds are naturally determined by internal properties (essences). Generic statements (“men like sports”) are purported to evoke this bias. We advance methods by contrasting beliefs that a category is a kind with beliefs that a category has essential structure. We reveal flexibility in the presence of generics: Across varied domains and property content, generic statements increased participants’ belief that a category is richly structured with high inductive potential. Generics caused essentialism in interaction with other cues (e.g., biological properties) that reasonably prompt essentialist explanation. People believe that some categories are kinds with reliable causal structure and high inductive potential (e.g., tigers). Widely endorsed theories propose that people are biased to assume kinds are essential, and so naturally determined by internal causal properties. Generic language (e.g., “men like sports”) is 1 mechanism thought to evoke this bias. We propose instead that generics principally designate that categories are kinds. Participants can entertain diverse causal structures in the presence of generics: Hearing that biological properties generalize to a category (e.g., “men grow beards”) prompts participants to infer essential structure, but hearing neutral or social properties (“women are underpaid”) generalized prompts other causal beliefs. Thus, generics induce essentialism only in interaction with cues that reasonably prompt essentialist explanation. We tested our model with adult participants (n = 739 total), using measures that disentangle essentialist beliefs from kind beliefs. In study 1, we replicate prior methods with our new measures, and find that generics influence kind beliefs more than essentialism. In study 2, we vary property content (biological vs. cultural properties), and show that generics only increase essentialism when paired with biological properties. In study 3, we show that generics designate kinds but not essentialism when neutral properties are used across animals, tools, and people. In study 4, we show that believing a category is a kind increases the spontaneous production of generic statements, regardless of whether the kind is essential or socially constructed. Generics do not necessitate essentialist beliefs. Participants were flexible in their reasoning about kinds.