Unsecured Debt with Public Insurance: From Bad to Worse
Unsecured Debt with Public Insurance: From Bad to Worse
复制标题
公共保险的无担保债务：从坏到更糟
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Simpson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kartik B. Athreya;N. Simpson
在美国的数据中，收入中断、接受公共保险和个人破产的发生率都是密切相关的。本文的中心贡献是在一个统一的环境中评估破产保护和公共保险，其中每个项目都改变了另一个项目的激励。具体地说，我们明确考虑了违约期权和公共保险造成的扭曲，以影响1)风险承担、2)借款和3)搜索努力。我们的分析得出了两个引人注目的结论。首先，我们发现，美国个人破产法是允许公共保险体系改善福利的重要障碍。其次，与普遍看法相反，我们发现，公共保险慷慨程度的增加将导致更多、而不是更少的破产。
In U.S. data, income interruptions, the receipt of public insurance, and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related. The central contribution of this paper is to evaluate both bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other. Specifically, we explicitly allow for distortion created by the default option and public insurance to affect 1) risk-taking, 2) borrowing, and 3) search effort. Our analysis delivers two striking conclusions. First, we find that U.S. personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier to allowing the public insurance system to improve welfare. Second, contrary to popular belief, we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more, not less, bankruptcy.