Small business set-asides in procurement auctions: An empirical analysis
Small business set-asides in procurement auctions: An empirical analysis
复制标题
采购拍卖中的小企业预留：实证分析
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.01.003
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Jun Nakabayashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jun Nakabayashi
作为公共采购的一部分，许多政府采用小企业方案，为企业提供合同机会，往往优先考虑由被指定为弱势群体的成员经营的公司。然而，这些计划所产生的再分配可能会给政府采购预算带来显著的额外成本。在本文中，在多大程度上，小企业设置assides增加政府采购成本进行审查。这些估算采用了日本公共建设项目的数据，其中约一半的采购预算用于中小企业（SME）。应用非参数估计的一个非对称的第一价格拍卖模型与附属的私人价值的盈利能力和企业规模之间的正相关关系，进行了反事实分析，以证明约40%的中小企业将退出采购市场，如果预留被删除。令人惊讶的是，由此导致的缺乏竞争将增加政府采购成本，而不是抵消生产成本效率低下。
As part of public procurement, many governments adopt small business programs to provide contract opportunities for businesses often with preferences for firms operated by members of groups designated as disadvantaged. The redistribution arising from such programs, however, can introduce significant additional costs to government procurement budgets. In this paper, the extent to which small business set-asides increased government procurement costs is examined. The estimates employ data on Japanese public construction projects, where approximately half of the procurement budget is set aside for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Applying a positive relationship between profitability and firm size obtained by the nonparametric estimation of an asymmetric first-price auction model with affiliated private values, a counterfactual analysis is undertaken to demonstrate that approximately 40percent of SMEs would exit the procurement market if set-asides were removed. Surprisingly, the resulting lack of competition would increase government procurement costs more than it would offset the production cost inefficiency.