Political Economy in Macroeconomics
Political Economy in Macroeconomics
复制标题
宏观经济学中的政治经济学
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Allan Drazen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Allan Drazen
新泽西州普林斯顿将自由化视为致力于经济改革的信号。我们还总结了资本管制的政治决定因素的实证研究。开放经济宏观经济学的另一个主要问题是主权债务，即政府欠外国债权人的债务。主权债务危机与非主权债务危机有着本质上的不同，而且本质上是政治性的。例如，由于它是由政府欠下的，还款决定与任何偿还能力的问题无关。除了少数例外，借款国在技术上有能力偿还债务，因此不偿还债务是一个政治问题。在第12.8节中，我们分析了主权借款及其偿还的基本模型，特别是惩罚在强制偿还中的作用。我们还考虑了在决定是否在国内或国外发行债务时政治惩罚与非政治惩罚的重要性。审议的最后一个专题是外国援助，特别是各国政府和国际金融组织为结构调整目的向发展中国家提供的贷款。我们的出发点是外国援助项目在减轻受援国贫困和刺激经济增长方面令人失望的结果，我们认为这种失败反映了援助的政治本质。出于一些原因，外国援助本质上是政治性的。首先，捐助者的动机可能是政治性的，不仅因为援助往往是出于战略性的政治原因，而且因为援助的性质（特别是其无效）往往反映了捐助组织内部的政治和官僚主义冲突。其次，援助的无效也很大程度上归因于受援国的挪用，人们普遍认为这反映了政治因素。有许多模型形式化了政治因素的作用，也有许多实证工作详细说明了政治因素在解释援助无效方面的作用。
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY account libcralization as a signal of commitmcnt to economic reform. Wc also summarizc thc empirical rcscarch on political determinants of capital controls. Another major issue in open-economy macroeconomics is sovereign debt, that is, the debt owed by a government to foreign creditors. hsucs of sovereign debt arc substantially different than those concerning nonsovereign debt and arc inherently political. For example, since it is oWed by the government, repayment decisions are not connectcd with any question of the ability to repay. With few exceptions, a borrower country has the technical ability to repay the debt, so that non-repayment is a political issue. In Section 12.8, we analyze basic models of sovereign ,c,, borrowing and its repayment, especially the role of penalties in enforcing repayment. We also consider the importance of political versus nonpolitical penalties in the decision of whether to issue debt at home or abroad. The final topic considered is foreign assistance, especially lending by governments and international financial organizations to developing countries for the purpose of structural adjustment. Our point of departure is the strikingly disappointing results that foreign aid programs have had in alleviating poverty and stimulating growth in the recipient countries, a failure that we argue reflects the political nature of aid. Foreign assistance is inherently political for a number of reasons. First, the incentives of the donors may be political, not only in the obvious sense that aid is often given for strategic political reasons, but also because the nature of aid (and especially its ineffectiveness) often reflects political and bureaucratic conflicts within the donor organizations. Second, the ineffectiveness of aid is also very much attributed to misappropriation by the recipients, where this is widely believed to reflect political factors. There are a number of models which formalize the role of political factors, as well as much empirical work detailing the role of political factors in explaining the ineffectiveness of aid.