Well-founded social fictions: a defence of the concepts of institutional and familial habitus
Well-founded social fictions: a defence of the concepts of institutional and familial habitus
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有根据的社会虚构：对制度和家庭习惯概念的辩护
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Ingram
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Burke;N. Emmerich;N. Ingram
本文涉及阿特金森最近对集体习性概念的批评，如“制度的”和“家庭的”习性，以捍卫它们的概念效用和理论一致性。通过这样做，我们促进了对习惯的灵活理解，既是作为个人的概念，也是作为集体的概念。通过保留这种灵活性(我们认为这符合布尔迪厄哲学的精神)，我们允许考虑个人习惯与集体的关系的方式。我们认为，通过认识到个体相互关联的习性的复杂性，集体概念超越了个人主义的描述，即只感知个人与社会领域的关系的方面。我们的方法使我们能够将社会行为者视为彼此之间的关系，并将其视为领域的组成部分，而不仅仅是在社会空间中策划的个人。这些论点将通过我们对阿特金森所说的制度和家庭习性的三个致命缺陷的回应来交织：即同质化、拟人化和实体主义。
This article engages with Atkinson’s recent criticisms of concepts of collective habitus, such as ‘institutional’ and ‘familial’ habitus, in order to defend their conceptual utility and theoretical coherence. In so doing we promote a flexible understanding of habitus as both an individual and a collective concept. By retaining this flexibility (which we argue is in keeping with the spirit of Bourdieuian philosophy) we allow for a consideration of the ways in which the individual habitus relates to the collective. We argue that, through recognition of the complexity of the interrelated habitus of individuals, collective notions go beyond individualist accounts that perceive only the relational aspects of the individual with the social field. Our approach allows us to consider social actors in relation to each other and as constitutive of fields rather than as mere individuals plotted in social space. These arguments will be woven through our responses to what Atkinson calls the three fatal flaws of institutional and familial habitus: namely, homogenisation, anthropomorphism, and substantialism.