A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard
A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.20151700
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发表时间：
2016-04
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Roland Strausz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Roland Strausz
众筹提供了创新，因为它使企业家能够在投资之前与消费者签订合同。在总需求不确定的情况下，这改善了对有价值项目的筛选。企业家的道德风险威胁到了这一利益。研究筛选和道德风险之间的后续权衡，最优机制的特点。流行的全有或全无的奖励众筹计划反映了他们的显著特征。只有当回报超过投资成本的幅度反映了道德风险的程度时，效率才是可持续的。受约束的有效机制表现为投资不足。作为筛选有价值项目的工具，众筹促进了社会公益。众筹是对传统创业融资的补充，而不是替代。
Crowdfunding provides innovation in that it enables entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this benefit. Studying the subsequent trade-off between screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Popular all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding schemes reflect their salient features. Efficiency is sustainable only if returns exceed investment costs by a margin reflecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. As a screening tool for valuable projects, crowdfunding promotes social welfare. Crowdfunding complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial financing.