Mobilizing risk: explaining policy transfer in food and occupational safety regulation in the UK
Mobilizing risk: explaining policy transfer in food and occupational safety regulation in the UK
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DOI：
10.1068/a140085p
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发表时间：
2015-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Howard, Michael
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Demeritt, David;Rothstein, Henry;Howard, Michael
本文采用政策分析的比较方法，探讨了在英国的职业健康与安全（OHS）和食品安全制度内和制度之间的转移和调整的制度因素。在过去的二十年里，历届政府都热情地将风险作为监管改革和“更好的监管”的一个关键概念来推广。“基于风险”的方法不是试图防止所有可能的危害，而是通过使用各种基于风险的指标和政策工具，将监管标准制定和执法活动集中在最优先的风险上，通过对其概率和后果的正式评估来确定，从而使监管更加相称和有效。但是，尽管面临着类似的外部压力，并分享许多历史和结构特征的职业健康安全，食品安全监管已被证明不太容易接受基于风险的改革，其组织原则和做法。为了解释这种异常现象，我们考虑了政策转移和流动性文献中强调的一系列解释。我们发现，采取风险的强制性驱动因素，在自上而下的放松管制或硬欧盟任务的政治压力的形式，是远远低于自愿的影响力，这反映了规范（即，共同承诺的比例，资源优先级和责任偏转）和模仿（即，模仿私营部门的公司治理模式）同构。我们的结论与更广泛的思考，我们的情况下，政策转移和流动性研究的意义，并限制风险作为一个普遍的原则，组织和会计，治理活动。
Using comparative methods of policy analysis, this paper explores the institutional factors shaping the transfer and adaptation of risk-based approaches to regulation within and between the regimes for occupational health and safety (OHS) and food safety in the UK. Over the past two decades successive governments have enthusiastically promoted risk as a key concept for regulatory reform and 'better regulation'. Rather than trying to prevent all possible harms, 'risk-based' approaches promise to make regulation more proportionate and effective by using various risk-based metrics and policy instruments to focus regulatory standard-setting and enforcement activity on the highest priority risks, as determined through formal assessments of their probability and consequences. But despite facing similar external pressures and sharing many historical and structural features as OHS, food safety regulation has proven much less receptive to risk-based reforms of its organizing principles and practices. To explain that anomaly, we consider a range of explanations highlighted in the policy transfer and mobilities literatures. We find that coercive drivers for the adoption of risk, in the form of top-down political pressure for deregulation or hard EU mandates, are much less influential than voluntary ones, which reflect both normative (ie, shared commitments to proportionality, resource prioritization, and blame deflection) and mimetic (ie, imitation of private sector corporate governance models) isomorphism. We conclude with wider reflections about the significance of our cases for policy transfer and mobilities research and for the limits to risk as a universal principle for organizing, and accounting for, governance activity.