Civil Conflict and Agenda-Setting Speed in the United Nations Security Council
Civil Conflict and Agenda-Setting Speed in the United Nations Security Council
复制标题
内部冲突与联合国安理会议程制定速度
DOI：
10.1093/isq/sqaa017
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
J. Golub
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Martin Binder;J. Golub
只有在国内冲突首先进入安理会议程的情况下，联合国安全理事会（安理会）才能对该冲突作出反应。有些冲突在开始后几天内就被列入安理会的议程，有些冲突在几年（甚至几十年）之后才被列入安理会的议程，有些冲突从未被列入安理会的议程。到目前为止，只有少数研究关注了联合国安理会议程设置的关键阶段，而且没有研究过议程设置的速度。为了填补这一重要的空白，我们开发并测试了一个新的理论框架，该框架结合了现实主义和建构主义理论的见解以及制度主义理论和议价理论的经验教训。通过对原始数据集的生存分析，我们表明常任理事国（P-5）的狭隘利益很重要，但它们并不决定安理会议程制定的速度。相反，P-5的利益受到规范方面的考虑和冲突的严重性（在溢出效应和平民伤亡方面）引起的对安理会组织任务的关切的限制；被广泛忽视的当选成员的利益；以及P-5和E-10的偏好异质性程度。我们的研究结果有助于更好地理解联合国（UN）的运作方式，并对联合国的合法性产生影响。
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council's agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council's agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined agenda-setting speed. To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory. Applying survival analysis to an original dataset, we show that the parochial interests of the permanent members (P-5) matter, but they do not determine the Council's agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the Council's organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity among both the P-5 and the E-10. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the United Nations (UN) works, and they have implications for the UN's legitimacy.