Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy
Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy
复制标题
国内政治、外国利益和国际贸易政策
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_6
复制
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Ursprung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Hillman;H. Ursprung
本文旨在解释自愿出口限制作为国际贸易限制手段的政治选择。在政治职位候选人之间的竞争环境中，关税与自愿出口限制是一致的，这些候选人利用贸易政策声明作为寻求外国和国内生产者利益的政治支持的手段。在关税问题上，候选人采取了政治上具有争议的政策立场。自愿的出口限制在政治上具有和解作用，可以为国内外生产者的利益带来双赢。外国生产商获利的可能性是自愿出口限制的非自愿性的基础。如果自愿出口限制是可行的，那么选择关税来制定贸易政策是没有候选人的政治利益的。版权所有1988年美国经济协会。
This paper is directed at explaining the political choice of voluntary export restr aints as means of restriction of international trade. Tariffs are com pared with voluntary export restraints in a setting of competition be tween candidates for political office who use trade-policy pronouncem ents as a means of seeking political support from foreign and domesti c producer interests. With tariffs, the candidates take politically d ivisive policy positions. Voluntary export restraints are politically conciliatory and can offer mutual gain to foreign and domestic produ cer interests. The potential for foreign producer gain underlies the voluntariness of voluntary export restraints. It is no candidate's po litical interest to choose a tariff to formulate a trade-policy posit ion if a voluntary export restraint is feasible. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.